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Abstract
Using the data series produced from the collective research project on the dy-
namics of income distribution (Atkinson and Piketty 2007, 2010) we have studied
the e¤ect of di¤erent economic factors on top income inequality in the Anglo-
Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, USA). These e¤ects turn
out to be di¤erent for individual countries. The bubbles of nancial market ex-
plain the surge in top income inequality in the United States. Our results reveal
that the bubbles of nancial market increase top income inequality, although the
economic growth rate fails to increase top income shares in the United States.
The e¤ect of economic growth rate on top income inequality is also time varying
in the Anglo Saxon region. The positive economic growth rate of post 1980 turns
out to be pro rich but the economic growth rate of pre 1980 does not promote the
top income inequality. The top marginal tax rate and government expenditure
may have an equalizing e¤ect by reducing income of the rich, though the impact
of nancial development on top income inequality is inconclusive.
We have beneted from comments and advice from Jukka Pirttilä, Ari Hyytinen and Hannu
Tanninen. We also would like to thank Arto Luoma, Jani-Petri Laamanen, Jari Vainiomäki, Kaisa
Kotakorpi, Elina Tuominen and seminar participants at the University of Jyväskylä.
1 Introduction
The decline in top income shares until the mid-1970s or even longer can be found
almost in every country studied, but as Piketty and Saez (2007) stress there is a sharp
contrast between English speaking or Anglo-Saxon countries and other (non-Anglo)
countries ever since. The increasing share of the top income earners in total income
has been a notable feature of the changes in income inequality in the Anglo-Saxon
countries, including USA, UK, Canada (see Atkinson and Piketty (2007); Piketty and
Saez, (2003)) while in Europe Netherlands, France and Switzerland display hardly
any change in top income shares1 . In their discussion of United States top income
shares, Piketty and Saez (2003) argue that top capital incomes were reduced by several
major events, including the great depression, the two World Wars, and periods of high
ination. They also argue that top tax rates played an important role, with high taxes
on capital lowering the rate of capital accumulation. Following Piketty (2003), most
authors have argued that dramatic increase in tax progressivity that has taken place
in the inter war period in many countries studied and which remained in place at least
until the recent decades, has been the main factor preventing top income shares from
coming back to the very high levels observed at the beginning of the last century2.
Explaining the surge in top incomes in many advanced countries over the last 2030
years is more di¢ cult. What explains the growing top income shares in many advanced
countries during recent decades? What causal forces could have produced such dra-
matic changes in top income shares? Economists have formulated several hypotheses
about causes of increasing inequality. They are the shift from manufacturing to service
1The more recent estimates of Camille Landais (2007) show a rise in recent years in France.
2In fact Kuznets (1955) and Lampman (1962) also point out the role of progressive taxation as a
central factor explaining the declined income and wealth inequality in the rst half of the 20th century.
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production, technological changes, increased international trade, less progressive taxa-
tion etc. Of these the most frequently cited explanation is that technological advances,
particularly in the advent of computerized technologies, have created greater demand
for higher skilled and more educated workers and diminished demand for less skilled
and less educated workers. By means of a simple application of supply and demand,
this theory posits that skill biased technological change has driven up the wages of the
higher skilled and driven down those of the lower skilled. However, there is growing
group of economists who suggest it is not the sole explanation3 . For example, Piketty
and Saez (2003) challenge the skill-biased technological change thesis on the ground
that the timing of the shifts in income di¤erences does not support it in the US. Sim-
ilarly they contend that widening income di¤erences cannot simply be a response to
technical change or changes in the supply of educated workers, because the increase is
highly concentrated among the very highest earners. The theory is not able to explain
the rise of the working rich. Piketty and Saez (2003) instead argue that changing so-
cial norms is an important factor in explaining the recent increase in income inequality,
particularly in the rise of mega-incomes for the very top earners4. In the US, according
to Piketty and Saez (2003), the coupon-clipping rentiers have been overtaken by the
working rich.
According to Kuznets inuential hypothesis, income inequality should follow an
inverse U-shape along with the development process (see, Kuznets (1955)). The falling
top income inequality observed during the rst half of the twentieth century, suc-
ceeded by a sharp reversal of the trend since the early 1980s in the Anglo Saxon
3See e.g. Atkinson, 1999.
4In his book The New Industrial StateJ. K. Galbraith (1967) made important observations on
the role of social norm in management. He writes: management does not go out ruthlessly to reward
itself - a sound management is expected to exercise restraint . . . . With the power of decision goes
opportunity for making money. . . . The corporation would be a chaos of competitive avarice. But
these are not the sort of thing that a good company man does; a remarkably e¤ective code bans such
behaviour.
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countries contradicts the theory of Kuznets. Some economists argue that unequal in-
come distribution is a necessary but regrettable consequence of economic policy, which
enhances growth. For these economists, unequal wealth and income distribution is seen
as a necessary outcome of an economic environment that provides incentives for work,
entrepreneurship, and capital accumulation that in turn are key elements of macro-
economic success. In other words, economic growth favors the elite and exploits the
poor . Roine, Vlachos and Waldenström (2009) nd some empirical support for this
view. Atkinson and Leigh (2008) in turn fail to nd evidence for this however.
Many economists in turn have challenged the growth-inequality syllogism on the
grounds that in some circumstances, inequality can serve as an obstacle to growth (for a
survey, see Aghion, et. al. (1999)). They also blame income and wealth concentration
for tilting the political process in favor of the wealthy. In this view, progressive taxation
is an appropriate counter-force against wealth concentration. However, as pointed out
by Atkinson (2004), there are reasons to expect gross income inequality to increase as
a result of increased taxation5.
Financial development is also a potential determinant of top income inequality.
Building on the Kuznets hypothesis, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) show how -
nancial development interacts with economic development and derive an inverted U-
shaped relationship between income inequality and nancial development. There is
empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) (see
Clarke, Xu and Zou (2003), Beck, Kunt and Levine (2007)). Banerjee and Newman
(1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993) show however, that due to asymmetric information,
poor agents face credit constraints, which prevent them from starting their optimal
5Atkinson (2004) also point to taxes having ambiguous e¤ects in "tournament theory" (Lazear and
Rosen, (1981)) where an increased tax decreases the return of advancement to the next level but also
reduces the risk of attempting such advancement, and in the "winner-take-all" context considered in
Frank (2000), where progressive taxation reduces the expected returns of entry. See Atkinson (2004))
pages 135-138.
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investment projects. As a result, income inequality remains as long as the economy
faces asymmetric information. They also show that in the absence of asymmetric infor-
mation, income inequality shrinks and a negative linear relationship between income
inequality and nancial development prevails in the economy.
Some researches support the theory that nancial development may not decrease
income inequality (see Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Perotti and Volpin (2004)).
Claessens and Perotti (2007) show that participation of the economic elite (i.e., the
top income earners in political decision making) protect their interests by impeding
nancial development, which in turn limits the access of nance to all and the lack of
nancial access is a leading cause of persisting income inequality. Roine, Vlachos and
Waldenström (2009) also report that nancial development disproportionately benets
the rich in the early stages of a countrys development. Although in the absence of
skewed political participation of the elite, it could facilitate the access of nance to all
and, as a result accelerate the reduction in income inequality.
The literature on the causes of rising inequality also suggests other factors such as
globalization or openness as a share of GDP. Trade may reduce the income inequality
in those technologically advanced countries where the labor productivity is higher com-
pared to others. Dollar and Kraay (2000) suggest that globalization leads to fastest
growth and poverty reduction in poor countries. Tallo (2003) report that there is a
positive relationship between degree of openness and income inequality, however Roine,
Vlachos and Waldenström (2009) report that globalization has no clear-cut impact on
income inequality, if anything, the relationship between openness and inequality is
negative.
The standard theory of taxation states that high income people respond to im-
proved incentives to earn income, created by tax cuts. Piketty and Saez (2007) provide
important evidence that tax changes may not produce a permanent surge in top income
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shares but can fabricate a transitory e¤ect on inequality (see also Atkinson and Leigh
(2008), Saez and Veall (2007)). But Atkinson (2007) mentions that the reduction in
tax progressivity of post-1978 accelerates the surge in very top income groups in the
UK.
Government spending can also play an important role in impeding the surge in
income inequality. Government spending through government involvement in an econ-
omy could eliminate the problem of unemployment, which in turn reduces the degree
of income inequality (see Stack (1978)). Wol¤ and Zacharias (2007) also report that
income inequality in the United States could be reduced by net government expendi-
tures. Roine, Vlachos and Waldenström (2009) however, fail to provide such policy
issues of a country and report that the e¤ect of central government spending as a share
of GDP on the rich as being inconclusive.
Top income share series constructed for the USA (see Figure 1) by Piketty-Saez
(2003, 2007) suggest that bubbles seem to occur during a period of time when top
income shares have rapidly increased. Do large bubbles cause increasing top income
shares, or do the larger top income shares cause the bubbles? Of course, it is possible
that causation could be simultaneously and run in both directions, or it could be that
there is no causation at all and both bubbles and inequality are driven by a third
factor. A third variable causes both or the relationship is spurious - but that seems
unlikely to us. It is interesting to note in Piketty-Saez data that the dot.com bubble
in stocks in 2000 - occurred when income inequality (including capital gains) hit a
level very similar to that in 1929, particularly for the top 0.01%. The rise in income
inequality accelerates from 1995-2000 (see Figure 1)as the dot.com bubble is inating,
and a similar concentration of income is evident as the housing bubble is inating.
These observations are already a good reason to take into account bubbles as an
important factor seeking explanation for top income shares. The rise in income in-
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equality in the USA over the past 30 years has to a signicant extent been the product
of a series of asset-price bubbles. Whenever the market (be it the market in stocks, real
estate, whatever) booms, the share of income going to those at the very top increases.
When the boom goes bust, that share drops somewhat, but then it comes roaring back
even higher with the next asset bubble.
We focus on ve Anglo- Saxon countries; Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK,USA.
Of particular interest for us is to include asset bubbles as an important factor in explain-
ing the evolution of top income shares. Our approach extends the previous research
and reports that the panel estimates may provide us a long term relationship between
top income inequality and its determinants.
Following this, section 2 considers the data whilst the models for explaining the
changes in the top income inequality are presented in Section 3. Preliminary statis-
tics and the estimates of di¤erent models are reported in Section 4 and in Section 5
respectively. Concluding comments are provided in Section 6.
2 Data
We use the data series produced from the collective research project on the dynam-
ics of income distribution. These studies of the project have been gathered in two
edited volumes (Atkinson and Piketty 2007, 2010). The data for top income shares
in Australia cover the period from 1941 to 2002, Canada from 1941 to 2000, New
Zealand from 1924 to 2005, UK from 1918 to 2005. USA during the period from 1917
to 2007 are collected from Atkinson and Piketty (2007 and 2010). GDP per capita
and population size data are collected from Maddison (2006). The rest of the data
including nancial development, top marginal tax rate, globalization and government
expenditure are collected from Roine, Vlachos and Waldenström (2009) and updated
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from OECD database, PWT 6.3 and Financial Structure Database (FSD)6 . There are
some missing values in some of the series and those are replaced by linear interpolation
technique. The market value of listed stocks and asset returns data are collected from
Shillers web site.
Top income earners are often dened as everyone in the top decile P10(P90100)
of income distribution. The top decile is quite heterogeneous group (see Atkinson and
Piketty (2007)). The top income shares are based on personal income tax statistics and
income reported as gross total income, including labor, business and capital income
(and in a few cases, realized capital gains) before taxes and transfers. Top income
shares are computed by dividing the observed top incomes by the total income earned
by the entire (tax) population, led in a personal tax return.
The tax income data which is collected as part of governments administrative
process are not free from doubts. First, it is obvious that those paying tax have a
nancial incentive to present their a¤airs in such a way that reduces tax liabilities,
leading to tax avoidance and tax evasion. The second doubt is associated with the
income tax units and with the control totals for income. The tax unit may be an
individual (practiced in Australia and Canada) or a combined income of husbands and
wives (practiced in the United States). The tax unit may also change over time, for
example in New Zealand (since 1953) and UK (since 1990).
Another problem is related to the methodological issues of deriving control totals
for income, which is elaborately discussed in Chapter 2, Atkinson and Piketty (2007).
The di¤erences in methods are greatest in the area of income totals. The estimates of
share-within-shares, inverted Pareto-Lorenz coe¢ cients7and other measures of inequal-
6We would like to thank them for providing and giving us the permission to use their data.
7The inverted Pareto-Lorenz coe¢ cient  =1/[log(Top1%/Top0.1%)/log(10)]. It measures the
average income of people above y relative to y. Thus it measures the direct intuitive measure of the
fatness of the upper tail of the distribution. A higher  coe¢ cient means larger top income shares
and higher income inequality.
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ity within the top of the distribution, such as Top1/Top9 and Top0.1/Top0.9 where
Top0.9 is dened by (P99-99.9) are not a¤ected by the di¤erences in the income totals,
since they measure the shape of the upper part of the distribution (see Atkinson and
Piketty (2010)).
The fractiles Top0.1(P99.9-100), Top1(P99-100) and Top9(P90-99) measure the
fraction of total income received by the super rich, the rich and by the upper middle
class people respectively. The variation of Top0.1 and Top1 is very high, although
Top9 is fairly stable . According to Piketty and Saez (2007) the share of total income
received by the Top1 is about 18% before the First World War but only 8% from the
late 1950s to the 1970s and back to almost 17% by 2000 in the United States, although
a signicant increase in the top marginal tax rate is documented in 1993 (from 31%
to 39.6%). Similar trends are also documented in other Anglo Saxon countries (see
Piketty and Saez (2006)).
Like dependent variables, there are many approaches to derive the explanatory
variables of top income inequality. Financial development can be measured either by
deposits in private commercial and savings banks divided by GDP or by market value
of listed stocks divided by GDP. The total market capitalization, which is the sum of
rst two, can also be used as a measure of nancial development. Roine, Vlachos and
Waldenström (2009) have preferred to measure nancial development by total market
capitalization, however we have used bank deposits (deposits at private commercial
and savings banks divided by GDP) as our measure, since the asset returns along with
the bubbles of nancial market are considered as potential determinants of top income
inequality in the United States8. Moreover, the market value of listed stocks data
of New Zealand is not available. The measure of globalization i.e., trade openness is
8The changes in total market capitalization and asset returns are highly correlated. Hence the
consideration of total market capitalization as a potential determinant of top income inequality may
reduce the e¤ect of stock bubbles and vice versa.
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dened as the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP. In order to account
for the activity and growth of a government over the period, we include a measure of
central government spending, dened as central government expenditure as a share of
GDP. Lastly, we use statutory top marginal tax rates to control for the impact of tax
progressively, and in a broader sense political intervention, in top income shares.
3 Explaining Changes in Top Income Inequality
Standard multivariate analysis can help us unravel some of the economic factors of
top income inequality. This approach has already been applied by Atkinson and Leigh
(2008) and Roine, Vlachos and Waldenström (2009). We chose a similar model. The
major change from their model is the addition of the stock bubble variables as potential
determinants of top income inequality. We also consider inverted Pareto-Lorenz coe¢ -
cient as a dependent variable. Roine, Vlachos and Waldenström (2009) put together a
much larger and more comprehensive cross-country data set on top income inequality.
Most importantly, their data set has a panel structure with several potential deter-
minants of top income inequality for each country. This has made it possible to use
somewhat more advanced techniques to investigate the relationship between economic
factors and top income inequality.
We introduce the asset returns, particularly the bubbles of nancial market as the
potential determinants of top income inequality in the United States9.The bubble of
the nancial market, which is a transitory economic phenomenon, moving the market
upward from fundamental value, may create an arbitrage opportunity for stakeholders.
Consequently, in a bullish market, the shareholders and option holders exercise that
9Piketty and Saez (2007) document that the surge in top executive compensation in the United
States is the most important factor that has driven up top wage income shares and is due in large part
to the development of stock options. However in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and in the UK
labor income has clearly also surged even though the development of stock options has been slower.
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opportunity to produce extra income, which might accelerate the upsurge in top income
shares.
Figure 1 states that top income inequality declines during the First World War and
in the post war depression (1916-20) although it increases during 1923-1928. Interest-
ingly, the US stock market booms during that period - well known as the First bubble.
The First bubble bursts in 1929, instantly reducing the inequality. However, high stock
returns may be a reection of a surge in corporate prots during that period, which
is received by tax payers of super rich and rich decile as dividend. Afterwards, the
shocks of post First World War depression and the Great Depression and the dynamic
e¤ect of progressive taxation on capital accumulation mechanically reduce the increase
in dividend payments, which decline inequality until 1970.
Inequality starts to rise again from the 1970s and accelerates during the period of
1995-1999 after which it drops instantly, as shown in Figure 110. During that period,
the nancial market moves away from the fundamental value through the overvalued
Dot-Com companies, generating a bubble in the US stock market. Then tax payers of
super rich and rich fractiles exercise their high valued stock options and are able to
acquire money in the form of wage incomes, which acquires the favorable tax treat-
ment. Moreover, in a bullish market they also enjoy the capital gain by selling shares.
Consequently, the generated income from these strategies widens the gap among high
income earners. The bubble bursts in 2000 and the share prices fall dramatically, which
instantly reduced top income inequality. Thereafter, speculative bubble of 2007 again
elevates the income inequality at its highest level in the United Sates.
10We can see temporary shifts in top income inequality unrelated to bubbles in 1986 and 1993.
These temporary shifts in income inequality are for the changes of taxation policy in the United
States. This supports the ndings of Piketty and Saez (2007) where they state that tax changes may
not produce a permanent surge in top income shares but can fabricate a transitory e¤ect on income
inequality.
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The regression equation is as follows:
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where the variable yit measures the changes in top income inequality for country i
at time t11. The variables git; F indevit;Mgtaxit; Opennessit; Govspndit and Popit rep-
resent the growth rate of gross domestic product per capita, nancial development, top
marginal tax rate, openness or globalization, government expenditure, and population
size for country i at time t respectively. The variable Rit stands for stock returns and
the term d1 is a dummy variable, which takes value 1 for the period of 1923-1928 and
otherwise 0. The terms d2 and d3 are also dummy variables taking value 1 for the
period of 1995-1999 and 2004-2007 respectively, otherwise 0. The bubbles are expected
to increase the top income inequality more than Rit:
So far, we have not highlighted the e¤ect of the growth rate of GDP per capita
(here after economic growth rate) on top income inequality, keeping the relationship
as simple as Roine, Vlachos and Waldenström (2009). They have tried to nd the
determinants of top income inequality. Another group of economists also studied the
e¤ect of income inequality on economic growth. Most conclude that income inequality
generally impedes economic growth (World Bank (2005) and also see Banerjee and
Duo (2003)) although inequality may increase in the short and medium terms during
periods of sustained economic growth (Forbes (2000)). So there is a possibility of
11The variable y1it = ; where  is the inverted Pareto-Lorenz coe¢ cient. Another variables
y2it = (Top 1%/Top9%) ; y
3
it = (Top 0.1%/Top0.9%) ; y
4
it =  log (Top 1%) :
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reverse causality, which could be a potential topic for further research.
We believe that it is necessary to consider the structural break in top income shares
reported in the preliminary analysis section, to examine this relationship. This means
that the relationship between the regressand (i.e., change in top income inequality) and
the regressor (i.e., growth rate of per capita GDP) is time varying. For example; the
relationship between the change in top income inequality and economic growth rate
may be di¤erent pre- and post 1980. Moreover, to what extent the high income earners
are protected from the economic down turn? Are they collecting their income during
the economic boom? These interesting questions can be analyzed with the following
regression.
ymi;t = g
+
it (
m
1 + 
m
2 d4) + g
 
it (
m
3 + 
m
4 d4) + 
m
5  log (Findevit) (2)
+m6  log (Mgtaxit) + 
m
7  log (Opennessit) + t + i
+m8  log (Govspndit) + 
m
9  log (Popit) + "it
m = 1; 2; 3; 4
The economic boom is represented by the positive values of git i.e. g+it and the
economic down turn corresponds to the negative values of git i.e. g it for i at time t:
The term d4 is also a dummy variable, which takes value 1 for the period of post 1980
otherwise 0. Therefore the contribution of economic boom and the economic down
turn in changing top income inequality for the period of post 1980 is measured by
1 + 2 and 3 + 4 respectively. During this period there is an asymmetric e¤ect of
git if 1 + 2 6= 3 + 4: The term t captures the xed time e¤ect and the country
specic trend is represented by i: The country dummies are included to control for
time-invariant omitted-variable bias.
Although the above regression reveals the long term relationship between top in-
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come inequality and economic growth rate, this formulation does not directly address
the issue of how a change in economic growth rate or a change in taxation policy,
within a given country a¤ects the top income inequality of that country. Therefore,
country specic analysis may address the important policy question of how a change
in a countrys level of unequal income distribution is related to the per capita GDP
and/or government expenditure within that country. Moreover, if the structural break
is present in the relationship between inequality and economic growth rate in the Anglo
Saxon group then that structural break could be present in all countries within that
group. To examine these issues, we have applied the same regression model with a
constant intercept term for each country separately, where the xed time e¤ect and
country specic trend are assumed to be zero.
In all these models (equation 1 and equation 2), the assumption of no auto-correlation
in the error terms does not necessarily hold. Durbin Watson test statistics suggests
that auto-correlation is a problem in some settings. Therefore, we have estimated all
these models using the FGLS12 (feasible generalized least squares) technique, which
directly allow serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error terms.
4 Preliminary statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our main variables for the entire sample
period. Top1% has the highest mean and the highest variation in compare to other
measures of top income inequality. The correlation between top income inequality and
the level of economic development, which is proxied by GDP per capital, is mostly
12Model 1 and Model 2 can also be estimated by using the dynamic rst di¤erence specication. The
inclusion of a lag dependent variable will correlate with the unobserved xed e¤ects, and thus we may
get biased results. It is also necessary to note that we have large time series data and the number of
countries under consideration is small (ve countries), so the GMM (generalized method of moments)
procedure is not appropriate in our settings. This methodology is developed for small T, large N
panels, meaning few time periods and many individuals (see Roine, Vlachos and Waldenström (2009),
Roodman (2007) for details).
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insignicant. But in some cases it is negative13.But this relationship changes when
we split the full sample period into two parts: pre 1980 and post 1980. Figure 2a
and Figure 2b show that this relationship is negative pre 1980 but it is positive post
1980 in each country. The relationship between the level of economic development and
the inequality however, is not strong post 1980 in New Zealand. Thus we may fail
to capture the structural break in the relationship between top income inequality and
economic growth rate in that country.
5 Model Estimates
The results of Model 1 are represented in Table 2. In this simple specication, the
coe¢ cients of stock bubbles are positive and highly signicant. This means the bubbles
of the nancial market have a positive impact on the changes in top income inequality.
Therefore, the bubbles produce the extra income for the people of the upper fractile,
which accelerates top income inequality. Assets return increases top income inequality
in every case of inequality measure but slower than the bubbles14.The most plausible
explanation for this nding is that the top income group has a larger share of their
income associated with the bubbles of the nancial market. This explains the recent
upsurge in top income shares in the United States. The above evidence is also true
when we consider real returns instead of nominal returns in our analysis15.
The regression coe¢ cient of the per capita growth rate is negative for Top1%,
and statistically insignicant in all cases of inequality measures in the United States.
This means that the economic growth rate is at least not pro rich and if anything, it
13The values are 0.228, -0.1482, 0.229 and -0.014 for inverted Pareto-Lorenz coe¢ cient,
Top1%/Top9%, Top0.1/Top0.9% and Top1% respectively for the Anglo Saxon group. The corre-
lation coe¢ cient is positive for all cases of inequality measures in the United States.
14The Dot-Com bubble seems to have positive e¤ect in the growth of Top1% but less stronger than
other bubbles.
15The results of real returns are available upon request.
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may decrease the income of the rich. This evidence contradicts the nding of Roine,
Vlachos and Waldenström (2009) where they document that the high economic growth
disproportionately benets the rich over the entire twentieth century. The insignicant
relationship between the economic growth rate and the changes in inequality is still
valid when we re-estimate Model 1 without assets return and bubbles16. Until now,
we could state that the economic growth rate fails to elevate, while bubbles accelerate
income for the rich. This in turn widens the gap among high income earners in the
United States.
To further investigate this relationship we allow for a structural break in Model 1.
The estimated results of Model 2 are reported in Table 3 to Table 5. The structural
break coe¢ cients 2 and 4 have their expected sign positive and negative respectively
for the Anglo Saxon group as well as, for individual countries except New Zealand.
The likelihood ratio (LR) test supports the hypothesis of the structural break in the
relationship between economic growth rate and the changes in top income inequal-
ity. The LR ratio test fails however, to detect such relationship for Top1/Top9% and
Top0.1/Top0.9% in New Zealand and for Top1/Top9% in Australia17. The coe¢ cient
2 is signicantly positive and the coe¢ cient 4 is negative but statistically insignicant
for most cases of inequality measures in the Anglo Saxon group (see Table 5)18.This
nding indicates that positive economic growth rate of the post 1980 increases top in-
16This result also holds if we use total market capitalization as a proxy for nancial development.
Newey-West procedure also applied to estimate this restricted model where the total market capi-
talization is considered as a proxy for nancial development. The auto-correlated heteroskedasticity
adjusted estimates remain the same with FGLS estimates.
17The F-test statistics also provide us the similar result, although it may fail to capture this rela-
tionship if either of the structural break coe¢ cients is insignicant. Note that the LM test statistics
and the F-test statistics are asymptotically equivalent for a large sample size. It is also worthwhile
to mention that the correlation between economic growth rate and stock market return is very high
in recent period particularly after 1980. Thus the inclusion of total market capitalization as a proxy
for nancial development in Model 2 may create an obstacle for the structural break coe¢ cients to be
signicant.
18The coe¢ cient 4 is marginally signicant for Top1% in the Anglo Saxon Group.
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come inequality, but negative economic growth rate of the post 1980 has no impact on
changing top income inequality. This explains that the rich accumulate their income
during good economic conditions and are well hedged during bad economic periods.
Contrary to this, neither a positive nor negative economic growth rate of the pre 1980
has any e¤ect in changing top income inequality.
The country specic analysis shows, coe¢ cients 1 and 3 are statistically insignif-
icant in most cases of inequality measures, in each country, with some exceptions. In
general, economic growth rate of the pre 1980 has no impact on changing top income
inequality, if anything it may be negative19. The coe¢ cient 2 is signicantly positive
in the UK and Canada but it has negative sign in Australia. Another coe¢ cient 4 is
negative as expected, and statistically signicant in some cases of inequality measures
in Australia. The implication of this nding is that the negative economic growth
rate of the post 1980 decreases the top income inequality in Australia, while British
and Canadian top income earners are well hedged during bad economic periods20.This
indicates that the relationship between the economic growth rate and the top income
inequality changes over time and is di¤erent for each country.
In summary, we could state that the economic growth rate of the pre 1980 has no
impact on changing top income inequality, if anything this relationship seems to be
negative. The e¤ect of economic growth rate of the post 1980 on the changes of top
income inequality however, is not the same for each country. Positive economic growth
rate of the post 1980 turns out to be pro rich, but the impact of negative growth rate
of the post 1980 is mostly insignicant, although in some cases it could reduce the
19The coe¢ cient 3 is negative and signicant only in one case, that of the UK, reported in Table
4. The coe¢ cient 1 is negative and statistically signicant in some cases of inequality measure in
Canada. As an exception the coe¢ cient 3 is signicantly positive in some cases of Australia and
New Zealand.
20Exceptionally the coe¢ cient 4 is signicantly negative for Top1% in UK. The Newey-West pro-
cedure also provides us the similar ndings.
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income of the rich. The panel estimates also state that positive economic growth rate
of the post 1980 increases top income inequality, whilst the negative economic growth
rate of the post 1980 has no impact on changing top income inequality.
The e¤ect of nancial development (i.e., bank deposits), turns out to be inconsistent
in panel estimates, reported in Table 5. However, the e¤ect of nancial development
on top income inequality is positive when we consider total market capitalization as
a proxy for nancial development. This evidence supports the ndings of Boot and
Thakor (1997) and Levine (2005) and Roine, Vlachos and Waldenström (2009). Coun-
try specic analysis reveals that the nancial development accelerates income for the
rich (Top1%) in all Anglo Saxon countries, except United States and Canada (see Table
2 and Table 3). Interestingly, nancial development decreases the income inequality in
some cases of UK21.The impact of nancial development on the changes of top income
inequality in Anglo Saxon countries however, is inconclusive except in New Zealand
(see Table 4) when we consider all the inequality measures. Thus the e¤ect of nan-
cial development on top income inequality is mixed and di¤erent for each country.
This e¤ect also seems to be dependent on proxy variable. The Newey-West estimation
procedure also provides us the similar results.
The e¤ect of the top marginal tax rates on the changes in top income inequality22
is debatable . At a rst glance it seems that the top marginal tax rates may have
a negative impact on top income inequality although it could be positive from the
theoretical point of view (see Atkinson (2004)). According to our estimates, the e¤ect
of taxation on changes in top income inequality is negative, but mostly insignicant
in panel estimates, as reported in Table 5. Country specic analysis states however
21The coe¢ cient of nancial development changes sign from negative to positive when we consider
total capitalization as a proxy for nancial development.
22We use di¤erent kinds of top income inequality measures. These are inverted Pareto-Lorenz
coe¢ cient, ratio of the Top1% and Top9%, ratio of the Top0.1% and Top0.9%, and the growth of
Top1%.
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that the e¤ect of taxation on income inequality is negative and statistically signicant
in Australia and Canada, while insignicant in the New Zealand UK and the United
States (see, Table 2 to Table 4).
Another important determinant of top income inequality is government expenditure
which reduces income inequality by decreasing the income of the rich in panel estimates,
as reported in Table 5. This evidence contradicts the nding of Roine, Vlachos and
Waldenström (2009). The e¤ect of government expenditure on changes in income
inequality is also negative for New Zealand, UK and the United States (see Table 2 to
Table 4). This evidence is also holds for Canada, but statistically insignicant in all
cases of inequality measures, as reported in Table 323.
Finally, openness or globalization is not strongly related to changes in income in-
equality in panel estimates. This nding supports previous research of Roine, Vlachos
and Waldenström (2009) and Dollar and Kraay (2004). Country specic analysis is
unable to detect any relationship between top income inequality and globalization, al-
though in some cases of inequality measures in UK and the United States, globalization
seems to increase the top income inequality (see Table 2 and Table 4).
23The results are mixed for Australia although government expenditure seems to decrease the growth
of Top1%. The Newey-West procedure provides us the similar results. These results are also free from
choosing the proxy variable of nancial development.
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6 Conclusions
Using the data series produced from the collective research project on the dynamics
of income distribution (Atkinson and Piketty 2007, 2010) we have studied the e¤ect
of di¤erent economic factors on top income inequality in ve Anglo-Saxon countries.
These e¤ects turn out to be di¤erent for individual countries. The bubbles of nancial
market explain the surge in top income inequality in the United States. Our results
reveals that the bubbles of nancial market increase top income inequality, although
the economic growth rate fails to increase top income shares in the United States.
The e¤ect of economic growth rate on top income inequality is also time varying in
the Anglo Saxon region. The positive economic growth rate of post 1980 turns out
to be pro rich but the economic growth rate of pre 1980 does not promote the top
income inequality. The top marginal tax rate and government expenditure may have
an equalizing e¤ect by reducing income of the rich, though the impact of nancial
development on top income inequality is inconclusive.
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Figure 1: Assets return and Top income inequality in the United States.
25
Pre1980 Post1980
5000 10000 15000 20000
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
3.
0
3.
5
Inverted   Pareto
Lev e l o f ec onomic  dev e lpomen t
To
p 
 in
co
m
e 
 in
eq
ua
lity
A ustralia
C anada
N ew  Zealand
U K
U S A
10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
3.
0
3.
5
Inverted  Pareto
Lev e l o f ec onomic  dev e lopmen t
To
p 
 in
co
m
e 
 in
eq
ua
lity
A ustralia
C anada
N ew  Zealand
U K
U S A
5000 10000 15000 20000
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Top1%/Top9%
Lev e l o f ec onomic  dev e lopmen t
To
p 
in
co
m
e 
in
eq
ua
lity
A ustralia
C anada
N ew  Zealand
U K
U S A
10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Top1%/Top9%
Lev e l o f ec onomic  dev e lopmen t
To
p 
in
co
m
e 
in
eq
ua
lity
A ustralia
C anada
N ew  Zealand
U K
U S A
Figure 2a: Relationship between top income inequality and level of economic
development.
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Figure 2b: Relationship between top income inequality and level of economic
development.
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Table 1:
Summary statistics
Panel A : Descriptive statistics of the United States
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Pareto Lorenz 2.406 0.406 1.860 3.540
Top1% 14.16 3.983 8.86 23.94
Top1/Top9% 0.561 0.138 0.360 0.944
Top0.1/Top0.9% 0.625 0.164 0.405 1.093
GDP per capita 14572 7837.307 4777 31352
Assets Return 0.117 0.186 -0.429 0.549
Financial dev. 0.551 0.119 0.338 0.738
Top marginal tax 0.603 0.225 0.240 0.940
Openness 12.082 6.398 5.242 29.074
Givt. expenditure 0.147 0.070 0.030 0.429
Population 189236 59573.29 103817 301280
Panel B : Descriptive statistics of the Anglo Saxon group
Pareto Lorenz 1.954 0.442 1.445 3.545
Top1% 10.500 4.033 4.610 23.940
Top1/Top9% 0.441 0.176 0.220 1.082
Top0.1/Top0.9% 0.448 0.174 0.254 1.093
GDP per capita 12141 5771.64 4327 31352
Financial dev. 0.459 0.195 0.049 1.155
Top marginal tax 0.619 0.195 0.225 0.980
Openness 35.920 16.673 5.242 85.464
Givt. expenditure 0.158 0.051 0.030 0.429
Population 63135 78393.32 1350 301280
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Table 2:
Estimates of model one represented by equation 1 : p-values reported in square
brackets.
United States of America (USA)
Par. Ests. y1 y2 y3 y4
0 0.005 0.018 0.002 0.041
[0.891] [0.159] [0.889] [0.069]
1 0.226 0.068 0.093 -0.204
[0.350] [0.399] [0.335] [0.117]
2 0.384 0.014 0.170 -0.383
[0.497] [0.925] [0.443] [0.188]
3 -0.021 0.003 -0.013 -0.032
[0.849] [0.919] [0.764] [0.543]
4 0.060 0.200 0.023 0.003
[0.741] [0.033] [0.741] [0.966]
5 -0.258 -0.064 -0.105 -0.080
[0.003] [0.007] [0.003] [0.027]
6 0.332 0.132 0.129 0.282
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
7 0.367 0.165 0.147 0.164
[0.015] [0.000] [0.016] [0.092]
8 0.231 0.070 0.100 0.092
[0.047] [0.055] [0.037] [0.136]
9 1.603 0.477 0.668 0.577
[0.041] [0.060] [0.046] [0.022]
10 -5.096 -3.435 -2.022 -5.894
[0.099] [0.000] [0.097] [0.001]
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Table 3:
Estimates of model two represented by equation 2 : p-values reported in square
brackets.
Australia Canada
Par. Ests. y1 y2 y3 y4 y1 y2 y3 y4
0 -0.004 0.005 -0.002 -0.000 -0.012 0.002 -0.011 0.008
[0.862] [0.751] [0.819] [0.986] [0.368] [0.638] [0.037] [0.521]
1 -0.321 0.010 -0.087 0.097 -0.033 -0.175 -0.040 -1.149
[0.255] [0.941] [0.436] [0.714] [0.916] [0.012] [0.659] [0.000]
2 0.957 0.244 0.491 1.112 1.982 0.360 0.780 1.230
[0.436] [0.350] [0.325] [0.126] [0.003] [0.021] [0.002] [0.012]
3 1.630 0.115 0.648 2.283 0.359 -0.195 0.108 -0.607
[0.006] [0.790] [0.004] [0.053] [0.139] [0.255] [0.180] [0.253]
4 -3.001 -0.454 -1.242 -3.950 0.665 -0.011 0.173 -0.905
[0.011] [0.423] [0.001] [0.012] [0.828] [0.972] [0.861] [0.312]
5 -0.023 0.047 0.015 0.937 0.281 -0.054 0.087 -0.228
[0.943] [0.812] [0.896] [0.017] [0.222] [0.271] [0.210] [0.140]
6 -0.615 -0.035 -0.255 -0.755 -0.133 -0.043 -0.039 -0.074
[0.018] [0.818] [0.009] [0.006] [0.033] [0.000] [0.040] [0.067]
7 0.034 0.004 -0.020 -0.254 0.023 -0.004 0.047 0.031
[0.812] [0.947] [0.678] [0.102] [0.883] [0.888] [0.441] [0.778]
8 0.063 -0.070 0.019 -0.224 -0.016 -0.023 -0.010 -0.065
[0.473] [0.269] [0.585] [0.064] [0.738] [0.140] [0.476] [0.086]
9 -0.077 -0.542 -0.070 -0.957 0.154 -0.009 0.404 0.530
[0.958] [0.531] [0.898] [0.581] [0.777] [0.961] [0.014] [0.382]
LR-test 64.611 1.987 66.125 36.562 11.580 11.963 20.066 16.191
Strl.Change [0.000] [0.370] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000]
30
Table 4:
Estimates of model two represented by equation 2 : p-values reported in square
brackets..
New Zealand United Kingdom (UK)
Par. Ests. y1 y2 y3 y4 y1 y2 y3 y4
0 0.036 0.009 0.009 0.025 0.017 -0.008 0.006 -0.026
[0.019] [0.102] [0.083] [0.170] [0.280] [0.002] [0.266] [0.000]
1 -0.109 0.035 -0.013 -0.203 -1.099 -0.024 -0.447 0.256
[0.597] [0.743] [0.846] [0.563] [0.062] [0.667] [0.056] [0.050]
2 -1.050 0.182 -0.321 -0.983 1.534 0.522 0.650 1.377
[0.014] [0.232] [0.073] [0.030] [0.034] [0.000] [0.025] [0.011]
3 0.059 0.338 0.022 1.174 0.783 0.178 0.316 -0.515
[0.707] [0.007] [0.702] [0.005] [0.545] [0.052] [0.513] [0.000]
4 -0.382 -0.491 -0.459 -2.963 -2.436 -1.137 -0.939 -3.811
[0.957] [0.794] [0.858] [0.701] [0.101] [0.127] [0.089] [0.000]
5 0.656 0.213 0.241 0.833 -0.341 0.055 -0.129 0.095
[0.017] [0.002] [0.011] [0.000] [0.025] [0.085] [0.024] [0.009]
6 0.056 0.031 0.022 0.151 0.015 -0.019 0.006 -0.060
[0.446] [0.179] [0.376] [0.064] [0.815] [0.152] [0.826] [0.147]
7 0.046 -0.018 0.013 -0.105 0.482 0.014 0.199 -0.008
[0.311] [0.294] [0.400] [0.121] [0.051] [0.221] [0.037] [0.821]
8 -0.278 -0.121 -0.084 -0.437 -0.257 -0.057 -0.092 -0.082
[0.001] [0.001] [0.009] [0.001] [0.114] [0.012] [0.128] [0.095]
9 -1.722 -0.508 -0.486 -0.551 -1.787 -0.029 -0.774 -0.307
[0.013] [0.049] [0.057] [0.505] [0.091] [0.723] [0.046] [0.373]
LR-test 6.156 5.079 2.123 14.713 10.850 15.593 11.362 14.816
Strl.Change [0.046] [0.078] [0.345] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] [0.003] [0.000]
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Table 5:
Estimates of model two represented by equation 2 : p-values reported in square
brackets.
Anglo Saxon Countries
Par. Ests. y1 y2 y3 y4
1 -0.143 0.063 -0.054 -0.067
[0.286] [0.133] [0.260] [0.591]
2 1.282 0.339 0.425 1.222
[0.010] [0.002] [0.023] [0.000]
3 0.043 0.056 -0.019 -0.027
[0.783] [0.291] [0.754] [0.898]
4 -0.994 -0.315 -0.239 -1.821
[0.409] [0.304] [0.694] [0.022]
5 -0.150 0.015 -0.068 0.100
[0.104] [0.416] [0.043] [0.043]
6 -0.064 -0.022 -0.019 -0.034
[0.059] [0.021] [0.159] [0.265]
7 0.024 -0.001 0.031 -0.035
[0.657] [0.898] [0.106] [0.327]
8 -0.115 -0.016 -0.049 -0.072
[0.001] [0.069] [0.000] [0.009]
9 -0.157 -0.021 0.024 0.108
[0.687] [0.396] [0.867] [0.276]
LR-test 113.178 25.648 57.404 38.971
Strl.Change [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
32
